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ABSTRACT We investigate how external social ties, that is, social ties with individuals outside the borrowing
group, determine loan repayments of individual borrowers in joint liability group lending. We measure the
resources in external ties in terms of the informal risk insurance arrangement they embed. The ties borrowers
have with individuals outside the group and the informal risk insurance arrangement they represent, help to
survive in general, and repay their loans in particular. The risk of losing these ties increases the willingness to
repay loans, that is, these ties can be regarded as a form of collateral to stimulate loan repayment. The extent to
which these external ties are effectively pledged as collateral depends on the extent to which social networks of
group members are overlapping: the more borrowers’ networks of external ties overlap (referred to as informa-
tion channels), the higher the risk of losing the informal risk insurance arrangement in case of non-repayment. We
use data from 802 mapped social networks of borrowers’ internal and external ties from a microfinance institution
in Mexico. We find that group borrowers with external ties, representing a strong informal risk insurance
arrangement while at the same time being information channels, have lower repayment problems
1. Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) around the world have been successful in reaching financially
excluded poor households by implementing group lending with joint liability, a lending methodology
that targets poor individuals. The main features of this methodology are that loans are granted to
groups of individuals and that group members are jointly responsible for repayment. This obligation
incentivises group members to use their social ties to screen, monitor, and enforce loan repayment by
these other group members. In other words, it induces them to use their individual social networks –
defined as the sum of personal social ties and the tangible and non-tangible resources embedded in
them, that is, their social capital – as collateral for loan repayment.
The effectiveness of using social capital as collateral has been acknowledged in the microfinance
literature. Social capital prevents payment default in two ways. First, it incentivises group borrowers to
curb delinquent behaviour when the threats of social sanctions (that is, losing social ties and the
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tangible and non-tangible resources they represent) are real (Besley & Coate, 1995). Second, it offers
support that can be invoked to help borrowers repay their instalments. Several studies have empirically
identified the interaction between group members based on their social ties as a determinant of the
success of group lending (Feigenberg, Field, & Pande, 2013; Hermes, Lensink, & Mehrteab, 2005;
Karlan, 2007; Wydick, 1999).
Yet, these studies focus on internal social ties, that is, ties with other group members. The
importance of external social ties – that is, social ties with individuals outside the borrowing group
– in determining loan repayment of individual borrowers in joint liability group lending has not been
taken into account. We are the first to address this issue. The aim of this paper is to add to the literature
on the role of social capital in joint liability group lending by focusing on understanding the role
played by these external ties. Just like internal ties, these external ties may hold valuable resources,
which borrowers may use in case of need. As such, they are part of a so-called informal risk insurance
arrangement the borrower has with individuals in the community. This provides incentives to a
borrower to repay loans, because non-repayment may lead to losing access to the informal risk
insurance arrangement. Not repaying a loan may mean these external ties are no longer willing to
support the borrower in case of need. In addition, if social networks of borrowers outside the group
overlap (community members outside the group may be part of the network of two or more group
members, in this papers referred to as information channels), these community members can diffuse
information about a borrower’s repayment behaviour into the borrower’s network. If this is the case,
the borrower runs a higher risk of losing (part of) her informal risk insurance arrangement, that is,
other network members, including the other borrowers in her group, may also no longer be willing to
provide support in case of need.
We empirically test how group borrowers’ external social ties determine individual loan repayment
by using a large, original dataset mapping the social networks of 802 borrowers of Pro Mujer, a
microfinance programme in Mexico. We find that group borrowers who pledge strong external ties
(ties with community members outside the borrowing group embedding valuable resources) as
collateral face fewer repayment problems. Borrowers with stronger informal risk insurance arrange-
ments have a higher capacity to pay than borrowers with weaker informal risk insurance arrangements.
Moreover, the fact that social networks of group borrowers overlap outside the group reduces
repayment problems, because the cost of losing valuable ties due to non-repayment increases. These
overlapping networks thus provide an additional incentive for borrowers to repay. Our results are
robust to different specifications of the empirical model.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical framework
explaining the potential role social capital plays in group lending and discusses the hypotheses we
investigate in our empirical analysis. Section 3 continues with a discussion of the dataset, whereas in
Section 4 we present the empirical model. Section 5 provides a discussion of the empirical results. In
Section 6 we present our conclusions and policy recommendations.
2. Theoretical framework
Several studies have examined the social ties between borrowers of joint liability groups, also referred
to as internal ties, and their importance for a group member’s ability to screen, monitor, and enforce
loan contracts of her fellow group members. These studies argue that social ties can embed trust,
reciprocity and mutual support and that therefore they may be used as informal methods of support in
case of need. The proxies for social ties used by these studies include the type of relationship (such as
family, friends, or acquaintances; see, among others, Ahlin & Townsend, 2007; Al-Azzam et al., 2012;
Griffin & Husted, 2015), duration of the relationship (Hermes et al., 2005; Wydick, 1999), meeting
frequency (Feigenberg, Field, Pande, Rigol, & Sarkar, 2014; Feigenberg et al., 2013; Van Bastelaer &
Leathers, 2006), geographic proximity (Karlan, 2007), and sharing between individuals (Ahlin &
Townsend, 2007; Van Bastelaer & Leathers, 2006).
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These studies provide mixed results with respect to the relationship between social ties and
repayment performance of group loans. While they add to our understanding of why and when social
ties between group members may increase their repayment performance, they do not take into account
the potential importance of ties with individuals outside the borrowing group (external ties). Yet, we
argue that these ties may (also) affect a borrower’s repayment performance and that therefore a more
in-depth analysis of such external ties, what they embed, and how they are used in social exchange
between individuals forming a community, is warranted.
The starting point for such an in-depth analysis is the notion that an individual usually shares several
ties with other individuals within (and possibly even outside) the community (village, neighbourhood,
and so forth) in which she lives. A tie consists of social exchange and interaction between two
individuals. These ties form her social network. Social networks are patterns of social exchange and
interaction that persist over time. Social ties embed access to tangible and non-tangible resources, such
as mutual support, reciprocity, and trust. These resources enable individuals to use their ties as
informal risk insurance devices, that is, in case of need they can make use of these resources to
survive and overcome difficult situations.
A tie’s capacity to act as an informal risk insurance device is determined by the value (that is, the
resources) it can provide in cases of need. In the literature this value is referred to as the strength of the
tie, which is determined by the combination of the time two individuals spend together and the
emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual confidence), and reciprocal services between them. The strength
of a tie is the result of multiple social interactions over time. Strong ties are associated with a high
degree of reciprocity between two individuals. In case of strong ties, individuals may be more willing
to step in and help each other out, because the high degree of reciprocity raises the probability that this
support will be received back later in case of need.
Stronger ties are associated with a higher probability of repayment of group borrowers. Ties that
embed important financial resources may provide direct financial help for the loan repayment. Ties that
embed high non-financial resources may also translate into better loan repayment. This occurs because
non-financial resources may consist of labour input, sharing input and/or physical capital, and so forth.
Moreover, factors such as moral support, psychological aid, and social validation may indirectly improve
the economic success of borrowers. In the context of group lending, the informal risk insurance
arrangement may be embedded in the borrower’s internal ties (her ties with the other group members)
as well as in her external ties, that is, the ties with individuals outside the borrowing group.
Social ties can also be used to collect information available within the network (Granovetter, 1973,
1983; Lin, 1986). Since two individuals are linked to each other through a tie, they may know about
each other’s behaviour. Information exchange between borrowers of the same group happens auto-
matically as part of the group lending system, as members meet regularly to discuss their business and
make repayments. However, information may also be shared with other members in the network of
both individuals outside the group. The more the networks of two individuals outside the group
overlap, the higher the potential of information is diffused to other network members of both
individuals. This is referred to as ties having information diffusion potential. In the context of group
lending, the information diffused within the network of borrowers may be about who is having
problems repaying a loan and why these repayment problems occur. Based on this sharing of
information, members of the network inside and outside the lending group may decide whether they
provide resources to support the non-repaying borrower or put pressure on the borrower to make
repayments. They may also threaten, and perhaps ultimately break the ties they have with this
borrower, that is, they use a social sanction, because by not repaying the loan they believe the
borrower is misbehaving.
Summarising the above discussion, social capital has economic value for an individual. When
entering into a group lending programme with joint liability, an individual is effectively pledging her
social capital as collateral, because not repaying the loan may ultimately lead to a loss of value a
borrower obtains from the resources embedded in the ties. This occurs when network members decide
to break the ties they share and stop supporting the borrower in times of distress. They may decide on
this after being informed about the repayment behaviour of the borrower. Fellow group members
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(internal ties) are able to directly observe this behaviour, because they interact with the borrower on a
regular basis. Network members outside the group (external ties), however, may have more difficulties
in observing this behaviour. Most likely, they may be informed when they are in the network of the
borrower, as well as in the network of at least one other borrowing group member. In this case,
networks of borrowers overlap and information can be diffused from the network of one individual to
the network of another individual. The extent to which social networks outside the group overlap
determines to what extent a borrower runs the risk of losing access to informal risk insurance
arrangements in case of non-repayment.
The previous discussion makes clear that in order to be able to analyse how social capital affects
repayment by members of group lending models, external ties need to be taken into account, next to
the internal ties. When evaluating the role social capital plays in group lending, these networks and the
internal and external ties they entail, need to be mapped. Moreover, the value of each of the ties of the
network should be measured along two dimensions: its capacity to act as an informal risk insurance
device and its potential to diffuse information within the borrower’s network. However, research on
the role of social capital in joint liability group lending only focuses on internal ties and typically does
not measure the value of these ties. We address both these issues: we emphasise the role of external
ties and explicitly measure the value they embed.
To formalise the above discussion, let us consider a community, C, comprised of n individuals,
C ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nf g, and a joint liability borrowing group, B, comprised of two individuals from
community C; thus B ¼ a; bf g.1 To illustrate the importance of internal and external ties, we use
the network diagrams in Figures 1 and 2. In these figures, nodes represent individuals and edges
represent dyadic social ties. In Figure 1, the two borrowers, a and b, are linked by an internal tie.
Information is directly diffused within internal ties, because group member a (b) knows when
borrower b (a) has repayment problems.
When the internal ties of a group borrower are strong (the degree of reciprocity between two
individuals is high), group members may be more willing to step in and help the respective borrower
with repaying the loan. With strong ties, a borrower is more willing to help out a fellow borrower who
is struggling with making repayments, because the high degree of reciprocity raises the probability that
this support will be received back later in case of need. Thus, borrowers have a better repayment
ba
c
B = group of borrowers
Figure 2. Direct information channel.
a b
c
B = group of borrowers
Figure 1. Internal and external ties.
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capacity (or fewer repayment problems) when they have a higher number of strong internal ties.
Moreover, having strong internal ties may increase the potential cost a group borrower incurs in case
she does not repay a loan as she runs the risk of losing access to important resources embedded in the
borrower’s internal ties once she does not repay the loan. This may curb delinquent behaviour to avoid
losing access to these resources.
A borrower may also have strong external social ties, that is, ties with a high degree of reciprocity
with individuals outside the borrowing group. In Figure 1, borrower b has a strong external tie with
individual c. Yet this individual does not belong to B, the group of borrowers. Moreover, borrower a is
not linked to c. The strong external ties with individual c are part of individual b’s overall informal risk
insurance arrangement (together with the strong internal ties with a). Like strong internal ties, strong
external ties may play an important role in reducing repayment problems. In case of problems, the
borrower may ask for loan repayment assistance from the informal risk insurance arrangement
embedded in the borrower’s external ties with individual c. A strong informal risk insurance arrange-
ment embedded in a borrower’s external ties improves repayment capacity. In addition, having strong
external ties may increase the cost a group borrower incurs in case she does not repay a loan: when
social sanctions go beyond the group, the borrower runs the risk of losing access to important
resources embedded in the borrower’s external ties once she does not repay the loan. This may curb
delinquent behaviour to avoid losing access to these resources. The size of the informal risk insurance
arrangement embedded in the borrower’s strong external ties increases with the absolute number of
strong external ties an individual has developed.2 The higher the number of external ties, the larger the
pool of resources to which an individual may have access. Thus, we expect fewer individual
repayment problems the higher the number of strong informal risk insurance arrangements through
her external ties.
Hypothesis 1: A higher number of strong external ties of a group borrower is associated with a lower
probability of repayment problems
Since borrower b has an external tie with individual c and since borrower a is not linked to c,
transmission of information by individual a about the behaviour of group member b to individuals
such as c outside the group will not be possible, because the members’ external networks do not
overlap. However, the situation changes in Figure 2, when individual c is also linked to borrower a. In
this case, two borrowing group members have a tie with the same individual outside the group. This
allows individual a to transmit information about individual’s b behaviour to individuals in the
network of b outside the group (individual c in our example). We define these type of external ties
as information channels.
As discussed above, information channels facilitate the diffusion of information within the bor-
rower’s social networks. If information can be diffused within the borrower’s social network outside
the borrowing group, she runs a higher risk of losing access to informal risk insurance arrangements
embedded in her external ties in case of non-repayment. The threat of social sanctions in terms of
losing external social ties in case of non-repayment of the loan increases. The threat of losing valuable
external ties may incentivise group borrowers to better assess ex ante their capacity to repay the loan
and to make regular repayments once the loan has been obtained. From an information-diffusion
perspective the existence of information channels increases the likelihood of information diffusion
within the network. The likelihood of information diffusion increases with the absolute number of
such information channels a borrower has developed. Consequently, borrowers will face fewer
repayment problems, because they will more seriously assess their own repayment capacities before
taking a loan and consider making timely repayments after having obtained the loan.
Hypothesis 2: The number of external ties being information channels is associated with a lower
probability of repayment problems of a group borrower
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In principle, information channels may or may not hold important tangible and non-tangible
resources. In case information channels do hold important resources (they can be classified as strong
external ties), these ties may not only have the potential to transfer information, but may also be a
potentially valuable component of the borrower’s informal risk insurance arrangement. Assume
borrowers b and c are linked through a strong tie (a tie acting as part of the informal risk insurance
device; see Figure 2). In cases of economic problems, not only may b ask c’s help, but a may also ask
c to help b with repayment. In these circumstances, information channels are being used as part of the
informal risk insurance arrangement, improving the borrower’s repayment capacity. At the same time,
however, information channels that can be classified as strong external ties may also increase the cost a
borrower incurs in case she does not repay a loan. Information channels also being strong external ties
increase the risk of losing access to important resources embedded in the borrower’s external ties once
she does not repay the loan. This may further curb delinquent behaviour to avoid losing access to these
resources. We therefore expect borrowers with a high absolute number of strong information channels
to face fewer repayment-related problems.
Hypothesis 3: The number of information channels, which can be classified as strong external ties, is
associated with a lower probability of repayment problems of a group borrower
3. The dataset3
3.1. Institutional setting
To test our hypotheses we collected detailed information on the social networks of 802 group
borrowers associated with Pro Mujer Mexico,4 during the period of April to June 2014. Pro Mujer
is a non-governmental organisation that provides joint liability group loans to nearly 40,000 women
who lack access to basic financial services. Group meetings are usually held every two weeks, which
are attended by most group borrowers. The monitoring of borrowing group members and their (strong)
mutual ties, in combination with the close monitoring by the loan officers, help in reducing repayment
problems of borrowers.
3.2. Data collection process
To get the relevant information, the data collection process was organised as follows. Pro Mujer
provided us with the portfolios of 54 randomly selected loan officers. We pooled the groups managed
by these officers and randomly selected 300 groups. Randomisation resulted in a sample of 300 groups
managed by 51 of the 54 loan officers working in 27 branches across six Mexican regions. The groups
in our sample have between four and 25 members. The next step was to collect data from 900
randomly chosen borrowers, that is, three from each randomly selected group.
To map the social networks of the borrowers in our sample, we used a unique survey instrument
specifically developed for this research project. First, to map their internal ties, we collected the names
of all group members of a surveyed borrower from the archives of Pro Mujer. All borrowing group
members were then interviewed and answered a number of questions providing information about
their personal characteristics. Second, during the interviews we held with the borrowers we collected
detailed information about their external ties. In particular, we asked them to provide information
about up to three people outside the group who were part of their network and who they knew were
also part of the network of one of the other borrowers in the group, that is, we asked for external ties
being information channels (see Figure 2). Next, each interviewed borrower answered a series of
questions to identify whether these external ties were considered weak or strong ties, that is, they can
be used by the borrower as part of her informal risk insurance arrangement. To illustrate the data
collection procedure, take the example of borrower b who is a member of a group of five borrowers.
For this borrower, the maximum number of external ties for which we could potentially collect data is
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12 (five borrowers minus borrower b times three external ties for each of the other four borrowers). In
our data set, the number of external ties for which we finally collected data ranged from zero to 42.
The survey consists of 15 questions at the group level, capturing general information about the
group, information related to non-financial services provided by Pro Mujer, the overall repayment
behaviour of the group, and the presence of moral hazard behaviour within the group (that is, whether
any group member has misused the loan).
The survey for the individual borrowers contains 16 different sections, each covering different
characteristics of borrowers and their social networks. Sections 4–6 are most important for our analysis
as they capture questions related to the internal and external ties of borrowers.5 Sections 4 and 5 map
internal and external ties and capture specific dimensions for each tie, such as the relationship
between borrower and her tie, closeness of relationship, geographic proximity, and the frequency of
meetings outside the group. The questions in Section 4 are used to map all internal ties of an
individual borrower. The questions in Section 5 are used to map external ties, with a maximum of
three as explained above. In selecting these three ties, a borrower was asked to mention the names of
the first three ties that come to mind. This methodology is used extensively in sociological studies and
is known as the name-generator approach. Marin and Hampton (2007) argue that the first names that
come to someone’s mind are the ones she considers her strongest ties. Thus, we assume that the first
three ties mentioned by an individual are the strongest. In our research, we are specifically interested in
knowing more about the strongest ties of a borrower, as these ties are most important for her informal
risk insurance arrangement. These are also the ties she would like to keep, that is, they are assumed to
provide the strongest incentive to repay the loan.
Section 6 captures information related to aggregated resources embedded in all external ties of
group borrowers by using questions that have been adapted from research in sociology (Marin &
Hampton, 2007) to measure resources embedded in external ties. In particular, we ask the following
questions:
● ‘How many people outside the group could you ask to take care of your kids/house if you are
unable (sick, away from home)?’
● ‘How many people outside your group could you ask to lend you a small sum of money if you
needed it?’
● ‘How many people outside your group could you ask to lend you a large sum of money if you
needed it?’
● ‘How many people outside your group could you ask to give you some advice related to your
work/business if you needed it?’
● ‘How many people outside your group could you ask to lend you a bike/motorbike/car?’
Marin and Hampton (2007) argue that the use of these types of questions leads individuals to think
about their close relationships with core family members or friends. Therefore, the answers to these
questions, which refer to the social network of an individual as a whole (and not just the three most
important ones), can be used as an indication of the stock of all resources embedded in an individual’s
external ties. They thus reveal information about the value of the external ties that form the
individual’s informal risk insurance arrangement.
Table 1 summarises our final sample. In total, we interviewed 802 borrowers from 289 groups
managed by 51 loan officers from 27 branches, across six Mexican regions. Our dataset contains 6782
internal ties and 6450 information channels, that is, ties an individual outside the group has with two
members of the same borrowing group. Borrowers reported 797 internal ties with one external
information channel (that is, the social networks of both group members are overlapping with respect
to one individual outside the group), 494 internal ties with two information channels, and 1555 internal
ties with three information channels. This means that of the 6782 internal ties, 42 per cent (2846
internal ties) are ties that have at least one information channel. For the remaining 3936 internal ties it
holds that they do not have any overlapping network with other members in the group.
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3.3. Measuring the resources embedded in individual ties: strong versus weak ties
For each internal tie and for each of the (maximum of three) external ties for which we have collected
detailed information, we measure the resources they embed based on the questions in Sections 4 and 5 of
the survey. In particular, we examine the following six dimensions as proxies for measuring the resources
embedded in social ties: (1) the type of the relationship (that is whether individuals are core family, other
family, friends, acquaintances, or other6); (2) the duration of relationship; (3) the closeness of relationship;
(4) meeting frequency outside the group meetings; (5) geographic proximity; and (6) sharing during the
last 12 months. These six dimensions allow us to identify whether a tie is strong (meaning that the
resources it embeds are part of the borrower’s informal risk insurance device) or weak.
To identify whether a tie is strong or weak (that is, whether or not it acts as part of the
borrower’s informal risk insurance device), we use a clustering methodology that has been used
elsewhere in the literature on social ties (Dufhues, Buchenrieder, Euler, & Munkung, 2011a;
Dufhues, Buchenrieder, & Munkung, 2013; Dufhues, Buchenrieder, & Quoc, 2012; Dufhues,
Buchenrieder, Quoc, & Munkung, 2011b). Following this method, we consider a social tie to be
a point in the space of the specified six dimensions. We use two-means cluster analysis to identify
two clusters of ties, that is, a cluster of strong ties and a cluster of weak ties.7 The two-means
cluster analysis method aims to partition ties as defined by the aforementioned six coordinates into
one of these two clusters. First, using a clustering algorithm, this method randomly takes two
observations from the dataset. Next, in an iterative process, the remaining observations are
assigned one by one to one of the two groups based on their proximity (in terms of Euclidian
distance) to the group centre. Every time a new observation is assigned to a group, the group
centre changes according to the new mean of the observations forming that group. The process is
repeated until the algorithm converges.8,9 When clustering ties from our dataset, we pool all ties
(that is, both internal ties and information channels) and mark each tie so that we know whether it
is an internal tie or an information channel.10 The clustering is performed after removing the ties
with missing values on at least one of the six dimensions.11
We refer to the cluster with the highest group mean as the cluster of strong ties and the cluster with the
lowest group mean as the cluster of weak ties. The first cluster is formed by ties characterised by a strong
type of relationship in which two individuals have known each other for a longer time, feel closer to each
other, meet each other more often outside group meetings, live closer, and have shared goods or services
during the last 12 months. The opposite is true for the ties forming the second cluster.
Our cluster analysis provides the following results. The cluster of strong ties contains 2552
social ties, 761 of which are internal ties and 1791 are information channels. The cluster of weak
social ties contains 7602 ties; 4118 are internal ties and 3484 are information channels. Table 2
provides the summary of the results of the clustering analysis. These outcomes show that in
general the borrowers in a group do not have strong ties: only 15 per cent of internal ties can be
characterised as strong ties. For external ties this is 34 per cent.
Table 1. General description of collected sample
Number of Mexican Regions 6
Number of Branches 27
Number Loan Officers 51
Number of Groups 289
Number of Borrowers 802
Number of Internal Ties 6,782
Total Number of Direct Information Channels 6,450
Number of Internal Ties with One Info Channel 797
Number of Internal Ties with Two Info Channels 494
Number of Internal Ties with Three Info Channels 1,555
Number of Direct Information Channels per Borrower 0–42
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4. The empirical model
To empirically test our hypotheses, we use the following logistic model:




where Zij ¼ ln Pij1Pij
 
, and
Zij ¼ αþ βEij þ γDCij þ δCsij þ λI sij þ φNij þ χDij þ ωGj þ ε: (1)
Yij, the outcome variable, captures the repayment problems of borrower i from group j. To measure
the dependent variable in our model, we ask borrowers about repayment problems during the past two
loan cycles. To quantify repayment problems, we identify whether the borrower faced at least one of
the following situations during the past two loan cycles:
● ‘I had to borrow money from someone else in order to repay at least one instalment’;
● ‘I had to withdraw my savings in order to pay at least one instalment’;
● ‘I quarrelled/had arguments/disputed with my spouse or other family members because of diffi-
culties to repay the loan that I took’;
● ‘I had to sell some household assets to repay at least one of the instalments’;
● ‘I had to make personal sacrifices (eat less/withdraw children from school/neglect my health) to
repay at least one of the instalments’; and
● ‘Other problems’.
Our dependent variable takes the value 1 if the borrower mentioned encountering at least one of the
problems mentioned above, and 0 if the borrower reported no problems with repaying. In other words,
it distinguishes borrowers who encounter problems to repay their loans from borrowers who do not
experience problems repaying their loans. We select this variable to measure the repayment problems
of borrowers, because all borrowers in our sample have a clean portfolio, that is, they always manage
to find a solution to repay their loans. This suggests that problems with loan repayment borrowers are
faced with are due to cash flow management problems, instead of failing to make the necessary
repayments. The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable show that only 10 per cent of the
borrowers encountered repayment problems. This finding is not uncommon in research on micro-
finance group repayment.
We predict the likelihood of repayment problems by including the following variables into the
model. Eij is a vector of variables measuring different types of resources embedded in all
external ties of borrower i from group j. In the analysis, we include measures based on the
answers given by individuals to the questions in Section 6 of the survey. As explained, these
Table 2. Results of clustering
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questions provide information on the number of people outside the group a borrower can ask to
take care of her kids/house, borrow a small/large sum of money from, give advice related to work
or business, and/or borrow a bike/motorbike/car. These measures are included to test
Hypothesis 1.
DCij represents the number of information channels of borrower i from group j to test Hypothesis 2.
Csij is the number of strong information channels of borrower i from group j, allowing us to investigate
Hypothesis 3.
Next to these variables, we include a number of control variables. I sij represents the number of strong
internal ties of borrower i from group j. Nij captures the adherence to social norms, values, and beliefs
of borrower i from group j. Dij represents the demographic characteristics of borrower i from group j.
Finally, Gj represents the characteristics of the group j. The selection of these control variables is based
on previous empirical research with respect to the determinants of repayment performance of group
lending. A summary table describing the definitions of the main and control variables used in the
empirical analysis, as well as a table with the descriptive statistics of the control variables can be found
in the Supplementary Materials. The descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis are
presented in Table 3.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Baseline results
We start by discussing the baseline results for the model described in Equation (1). These results are
presented in Table 4. We follow a stepwise approach, that is, we start by presenting the results for the
variables related to the three hypotheses discussed in Section 2, and add a large set of control variables
to check whether our results for the variables of interest are robust in terms of the stability of the signs
and significance of the coefficients. In column [1], we present the results for the variables measuring
internal and external ties based on the full model (including all control variables).12 We follow this
approach, because we have no theory based on which we are able to exclude variables from the model.
Next, we rerun the full model but exclude control variables on statistical grounds in two consecutive
rounds, that is, we delete all control variables that are not statistically significant in the full model and
then repeat this procedure for the set of controls that is left after the first round of excluding non-
significant control variables (columns [2] and [3]). This approach is also known as the general-to-
specific approach (Brooks, 2002). One of the advantages of this approach is that ‘. . . the statistical
consequences, from excluding relevant variables are usually considered more serious than those from
including irrelevant variables’ (Brooks, 2002, pp. 209–210).
As discussed in Section 2, our first hypothesis states that a strong informal risk insurance arrange-
ment embedded in the external ties of a group borrower reduces repayment problems. Having a strong
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Repayment problems (dependent variable) 6740 0.10 0.30 0 1
Number of information channels 6447 8.37 8.36 0 42
Number of strong information channels 1791 2.42 5.21 0 42
Number of external ties who can lend a small amount of money 6764 5.05 47.06 0 1000
Number of external ties who can lend a large amount of money 6763 1.35 2.06 0 30
Number of external ties who can take care of kids/house 6761 1.91 2.04 0 20
Number of strong internal ties 761a 1.36 2.24 0 14
Notes: aThe 761 strong internal ties from our sample are distributed among 299 borrowers (that is, 299 borrowers
who have strong internal ties, with the remaining number linked to their peers by weak internal ties only). The
borrowers from our sample have 0–14 strong internal ties, with a mean of 1.36.
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informal risk insurance arrangement may improve the borrower’s ability to repay, because she may get
help in case of problems related to loan repayment. To test this hypothesis, we use the answers to three
of the five questions addressed in Section 6 of the survey, that is, the number of external ties who can
lend a small amount of money, the number of external ties who can lend a large amount of money, and
the number of external ties who can take care of house/kids in cases of need.13
The results presented in column [1] of Table 4 suggest that the support for the hypothesis that
a strong informal risk insurance arrangement embedded in the external ties of a group borrower
is associated with a lower probability of repayment problems is mixed. Two of the three
variables measuring the informal risk insurance arrangement have the expected negative sign,
but only one is statistically significant (the number of external ties who can take care of house/
kids in cases of need). The variable measuring the number of external ties who can lend a large
amount of money is significant, but has the opposite sign, that is, being able to borrow a large
amount of money from an individual outside the group increases the probability of repayment
problems.
According to our second hypothesis, we expect the number of the borrower’s information channels
to be negatively related to the borrower’s repayment problems. This hypothesis assesses the effect the
credibility of the threat of social sanctions has within the community of group borrowers. In other
words, the extent to which the social networks of the borrower’s peers overlap with the borrower’s
social network is expected to be positively related to the credibility of the threat that information can
be diffused into the borrower’s social network. Given the higher credibility of the threat, a borrower
may have incentives to better assess her personal capacity to repay a loan (that is, not over-state ability
to avoid future repayment problems) and/or may be more motivated to make timely repayments. As
expected, we find a negative relationship between repayment problems and the number of direct
information channels, but it is not significant (see column [1]).
Our third hypothesis states that the number of strong information channels is negatively related to
repayment problems. In other words, we expect borrowers pledging a high number of strong
information channels as collateral to have better repayment capacities. As explained in Section 2,
these strong information channels not only have the potential to transfer information, they are also a
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Pseudo R2 0.4221 0.3403 0.3071
Observations 10,664 12,648 12,932
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.
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valuable component of the borrower’s informal risk insurance arrangement. In case of repayment
problems, information channels can be used as part of the informal risk insurance arrangement,
improving the borrower’s repayment capacity. Information channels, also being strong external ties,
increase the risk of losing access to important resources embedded in the borrower’s external ties once
she does not repay the loan. This reduces delinquent behaviour to avoid losing access to these
resources. The results presented in column [1] clearly support hypothesis 3. Pledging a high number
of strong information channels as collateral is negatively associated with the probability of repayment
problems.
Overall, our results suggest that having a strong informal risk insurance arrangement embedded in
the external ties or having a high number of information channels alone is not strongly related to
having lower repayment problems. Rather, it is the combination of the two (for example, having
external ties that represent a strong informal risk insurance arrangement that are also information
channels) that matters in terms of helping and incentivising borrowers to make loan payments. Thus,
having strong external ties (capturing valuable financial and non-financial resources) with individuals
who are also part of the network of one or more of the other members of the borrowing group seems to
reduce repayment problems of an individual borrower.
We control for a wide range of variables. The choice of these variables is based on the results from
previous studies on group lending repayment performance. We have organised these control variables
into three groups. The first group captures various individual borrower characteristics. This group
includes a measure of the number of internal ties of the individual borrower. Previous research on the
impact of social capital on the repayment performance of individual borrowers has exclusively focused
on internal ties. Therefore, we deem adding a measure of internal ties important, that is, we keep this
variable into our model, even if it turns out to be insignificant. Other variables measuring individual
borrower characteristics include age, marital status, religion, education, household size, household
income, membership of formal and informal networks, and so forth. The second group consists of
borrowing group characteristics, such as the age, size, loan amount, and average interest rate paid.
Finally, we add control variables measuring the borrower’s values, beliefs, and social norms related to
microcredit activity. In total, we include 30 different control variables. Several control variables are
significantly associated with repayment problems.14
In column [2], we present the results when rerunning our baseline model, excluding the control
variables that were not statistically significant in the full model presented in column [1]. This does not
affect the main results for our three hypotheses. We still do not find evidence for the hypothesis that a
strong informal risk insurance arrangement embedded in the external ties of a group borrower is
related to repayment problems (hypothesis 1). The relationship between the number of information
channels and repayment problems remains insignificant as well, lending no support to hypothesis 2. At
the same time, however, the negative and significant relationship between strong information channels
and repayment problems (hypothesis 3) remains robust to excluding insignificant control variables.
We repeat the procedure of rerunning our model, this time excluding the insignificant control
variables in column [2]. The outcomes of rerunning the model are presented in column [3]. Of the
30 control variables we started with in the full model, 13 remain in our specification in column [3]. All
but two (including internal social ties) are statistically significantly associated with repayment pro-
blems. Most importantly, however, the results for the variables measuring external ties of borrowers do
not change when rerunning the model for the second time. We therefore conclude that, whereas we do
not find evidence for the first two hypotheses, we do find support for the third hypothesis, that is, the
number of strong information channels holding important resources is associated with lower prob-
ability of repayment problems of a group borrower.
5.2. Robustness checks and testing for endogeneity
Next, we carry out a number of robustness checks and test for endogeneity. First, we use alternative
clustering methods to determine the strength of ties. Second, we run the logit model with clustering of
the standard errors of observations at the group level. Third, we address problems related to omitted
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variable bias by using a method developed by Altonji, Elder, and Tauber (2005). Finally, we address
reverse causality problems by following Dufhues et al. (2012). A more detailed discussion of these
additional analyses can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
The results of these analyses are generally similar to those of the baseline regressions. Therefore, the
main message of the paper, that is, the number of strong information channels holding important
resources is associated with lower probability of repayment problems of a group borrower, still holds.
6. Conclusions
This paper focused on analysing how social networks of microfinance group borrowers come into play in
determining the repayment of joint liability group loans.We used a new framework that allows us to measure
the resources embedded in the external social ties of group borrowers, that is, social ties with individuals
outside the borrowing group. In particular, we focus on their role as information channels as well as their
contribution to the informal risk insurance arrangement of the borrower. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first investigating the importance of external ties of group borrowers. Our analysis is based on a large
and original dataset containing 802 mapped social networks of borrowers from Pro Mujer Mexico.
Our main finding is that group borrowers having a strong informal risk insurance arrangement
embedded in their external ties or having a high number of information channels alone is not strongly
related to having lower repayment problems. Instead, our analysis suggests that the combination of the
two (that is, having external ties that represent a strong informal risk insurance arrangement and that
are also information channels) really matters in terms of helping and incentivising borrowers to make
loan payments. Thus, having strong external ties (capturing valuable financial and non-financial
resources) with individuals who are also part of the network of one or more of the other members
of the borrowing group reduces repayment problems of an individual borrower. Our results confirm
that social capital plays an important role in supporting the success of joint liability group lending and
that social capital embedded in external ties is indeed important in this respect. To the best of our
knowledge, this finding is new to the literature.
Our results are robust to different specifications of our empirical model. Moreover, we test for
potential omitted variable bias and reverse causality problems. The tests suggest that these problems
do not affect our main results. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that our analysis is affected by
endogeneity problems. Therefore, we would like to stress that our results should be taken as evidence
for an association, rather than a causal relation between borrowers having social ties and their
repayment performance.
Overall, our results add to the outcomes of earlier studies, which suggest that social capital can
be used by MFIs as an effective device to ensure the success of joint liability group lending. The
main practical implication of this study relates to the way MFIs inform themselves about how
groups are formed and how this information is used in the loan disbursement process. In particular,
MFIs could take into account our outcomes in decisions about the location of new branches. Our
research indicates that successful repayment of loans is to be expected in areas where networks
between individuals are tight, not only between borrowing group members as most of the micro-
finance literature suggests, but also between borrowers and other individuals in the community
where they live.
Future research may further investigate how group borrowers’ repayment capacities are driven by
social mechanisms. To start with, our study may be replicated in other cultural contexts to determine
whether these results can be generalised. External social ties seem to be important predictors of the
repayment capacities of group borrowers, but different aspects of the networks’ configurations may be
more important than others in different cultures. Moreover, research on the interaction between group
borrowers and loan officers as external ties is scarce. Our methodology can be used to examine the social
ties between group borrowers and loan officers. Such research may reveal new insights into the social
mechanics behind the group lending methodology. Morvant-Roux, Guérin, Roesch, and Moisseron
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(2014) argue that the interaction of loan officers with their borrowers is complex and that their capacities
to build close relationships depend on the loan officers’ integration within the local social context.
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Notes
1. We restrict the number of group members to two for expositional clarity.
2. See Rooks, Sserwanga, and Frese (2014) on the determinants of innovative performance of entrepreneurs in Uganda. They
also use the number of contacts in the network as a measure of the resources available in the network of an individual to
support his/her innovative performance.
3. A more detailed description of the dataset and how it was collected is provided in the Supplementary Materials.
4. In the remainder of the text we will refer to the organisation as Pro Mujer, instead of Pro Mujer Mexico.
5. For a discussion of the questions in the other sections of the survey, see the Supplementary Materials.
6. In the category ‘other’, we include the peers that the group borrower said she does not know well, or individuals with whom
she has a bad relationship.
7. Factor analysis is not suited for testing our hypotheses, because it focuses on grouping variables according to patterns of
variation (correlation), not grouping objects (ties in our case) according to their proximity. Separation of ties acting as
informal risk insurance devices (strong ties) from other ties (weak ties) is essential for testing our hypotheses.
8. The algorithm converges when the best two groups are found (that is, when all observations are assigned to their
corresponding group and any further reassignment step does not have any effect). The continuity of the iterative process
until the convergence of the algorithm is important. After the first assignment of the last observation from the dataset to one
of the two groups, the algorithm calculates the new group centre and may conclude that several observations that were
previously assigned to one group should be re-assigned to the other. In this case, the algorithm will be resumed and run until
such changes are no longer necessary (the algorithm converges). If two clusters cannot be partitioned on the basis of the
dataset (the algorithm cannot converge), the data will remain distributed within one cluster.
9. The clustering method is sensitive to the choice of the starting values and outliers. When the data does not contain clearly
defined, well-separated clusters, there is a good chance that clusters based on different starting values will be different
(Makles, 2012). We therefore rerun the analysis by using alternative random starting values for generating the two clusters.
These alternative clustering results are generally consistent with the results presented in the paper.
10. It is important to pool all ties when clustering, rather than perform separate clustering of internal ties for direct information
channels, to avoid biases due to the sensitivity of the random setting of the starting values and outliers that may be specific
to a subsample. In this way, we ensure an internal tie characterised by specific values along the six dimensions will be part
of the same group as an information channel characterised by the exact values along the six dimensions.
11. In the clustering process, we lose 1903 (28%) internal ties and 1175 (18%) information channels. Loss of ties also occurs in
other empirical studies using cluster analysis for social ties (see Dufhues et al. 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013).
12. The full results, including those of the control variables, can be found in the Supplementary Materials (see Table 4).
13. After analysing the data, we identified high pairwise correlations between three variables that measure resources embedded
in external ties (based on the questions in Section 6 of the survey). In particular, ‘the number of people outside the group that
can take care of your house/kids’ is highly correlated with ‘the number of people outside the group that can give you advice
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on your business’ and ‘the number of people outside the group that can help you with a bike/motorbike/car if you need it’.
We dropped the latter two variables, retaining the former because it has the highest explanatory power for the model (based
on pseudo-R2 comparisons).
14. To save space we refrain from a detailed discussion of the regression results for the control variables. These results are
available upon request to the authors.
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